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Abstract
In 1950, Turing suggested that intelligent behavior might require “a departure from the com-
pletely disciplined behavior involved in computation”, but nothing that a digital computer could
not do. In this paper, I want to explore Turing’s suggestion by asking what it is, beyond com-
putation, that intelligence might require, why it might require it and what knowing the answers
to the 6rst two questions might do to help us understand arti6cial and natural intelligence.
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1. Introduction
In 1950, Turing [24] wrote a famous paper in which he planned to discuss the rela-
tionship between computing machinery and intelligence. He changed his mind before
he got very far when he realized that, although he had a precise de6nition of “comput-
ing machinery”, in terms of what we now call the “Turing machine” [22], he lacked a
precise de6nition of “intelligence”. So, instead of discussing intelligence, he changed
the subject [15] and discussed what he called the “imitation game” [24] instead. 1
If we try to use the ability to play the imitation game as a de6nition of “intelligence”
(as some people have done), we quickly notice that it is imprecise and (as I shall
suggest) misleading. Turing’s purpose in suggesting it was not to de6ne “intelligence”
but to draw “a fairly sharp line” [24] between what counted toward intelligence and
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1 The imitation game is played by a computer against a person. Both players are allowed to communicate
with a human judge only by means of a computer terminal and both try to convince the judge that they are
the person in the game. The computer wins if it can fool the judge for a speci6ed period of time.
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what did not. In other words, it was intended primarily to say what intelligence is not,
rather than what it is. That was the best Turing thought he could do.
But, toward the end of his paper (and elsewhere) he did manage to say a few things
about what he thought intelligence might be and how it might be related to computing
machinery. In eDect, he said that:
• The machinery of the computer is probably powerful enough to produce intelligent
behavior [24]. In other words, intelligence does not require any new, more-powerful,
hardware. (In other words, it does not require what Copeland and Proudfoot [6] have
called a hypercomputer.)
• But the machinery of the computer will probably have to be allowed to do more
than compute before it can be made to behave intelligently. As Turing [24] put it,
“Intelligent behavior presumably consists in a departure from the completely disci-
plined behavior involved in computation, but a rather slight one, which does not
give rise to random behavior, or to pointless repetitive loops”. (In other words, it
might require what Burgin [3] has called super-recursive algorithms.)
• The required “departure” will probably require allowing the computer to make mis-
takes because, again in Turing’s words [26], “if a machine is expected to be infallible,
it cannot also be intelligent”.
In this paper, I want to suggest a mathematical model of the mind in terms of which
I then want to try to develop a characterization of “intelligence” that is more precise
and, hopefully, more accurate than the imitation game. I am not going to argue that
the resulting characterization is necessarily what Turing had in mind, but I am going
to suggest that it might be both interesting and useful.
2. Intelligence
The American Heritage Dictionary de6nes intelligence as the ability to “acquire
and apply knowledge”. Although dictionaries can be wrong, let us take this de6ni-
tion seriously (at least for the duration of this paper) and think of potentially intelli-
gent machines as having two basic components. One component (the learner) acquires
knowledge. The other (the doer) applies the knowledge that the learner acquires. If we
assume that knowledge can be represented by computer programs (or something like
them), we can think of the learner as a system that generates programs and the doer




??? → learner → program → doer
↓
outputs
Fig. 1. The two components of an intelligent system.
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inputs
↓
programmer → program1 → learner → program2 → doer
↓
outputs
Fig. 2. Today’s “intelligent” systems.
It is not enough, of course, for a machine merely to have these two components.
Before a learner/doer system can be considered intelligent, those components will have
to perform at a certain level and one of the main questions I want to ask in this paper
is “What level might that be?”
The level reached by much of today’s work in Arti6cial Intelligence is not, I will
argue, high enough. Consider, for example, a computer program that uses some form of
tree search to play chess well enough to convince people who believe that intelligence
is simply the ability to simulate intelligent behavior that it is intelligent. Such a system
(see Fig. 2) has a powerful doer that does the actual playing and produces the required
behavior.
But that is not enough for a learner=doer system because its learning component is
too weak. All it does is translate a program, given to it by a human programmer, from
one language (a “high-level” language) to another (a “low-level” language). That is
not a job that seems to require a lot of intelligence (although writing a program that
does that job—a compiler—may require a great deal).
Perhaps, it is because the learner contributes so little to the system’s total intelligence
that some critics complain that, however intelligent such a chess-playing system might
appear, much of its apparent intelligence is provided by the humans who wrote the
program that the learner only translates.
It makes a certain amount of sense to assume that intelligence requires a learner that
can get along with instructions that provide fewer details than such a chess-playing
program requires. (We do tend to think of a person who has to be told exactly what
to do as not very intelligent.) But what?
People seem to learn to do things (such as play chess) from a variety of sources—
from examples, from vague instructions, from analogies and the like. Although ma-
chines can learn from any of these sources, I propose to focus on systems that learn
from examples.
That is how a child 6rst learns to use its native language, an ability that it needs
before it can deal with instructions and analogies. It is also an ability one can be asked
to demonstrate on an intelligence tests when one is asked to continue such series as
2; 4; 6; : : : . To do this one presumably has to 6rst come up with an algorithm that
would generate, not only the given part of the series, but the rest of it and then use
that algorithm to generate a few more.
We can think of such a learner-from-examples as a system that tries to develop a
program that can simulate the behavior of the device whose inner workings it cannot
examine. All it has to work with is the behavior (inputs and outputs) of the device.
(see Fig. 3)
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inputs
↓
black box → examples → learner → program → doer
↓
outputs
Fig. 3. A prototypical intelligent system.
Such a system might learn to play legal chess by watching a person play or by
playing games against a strong opponent.
Is it not easier just to tell a system what the rules are? It can be. It is probably easier
to tell people the rules of chess than to ask them to 6gure them out by watching games.
But there are situations in which people simply cannot be told what the algorithm is
(When they begin learning their native language, there seems to be no language in
terms of which they can be told.) and situations in which learning from examples is
easier. Thus, for example, people may learn the rules of chess by being told them,
but few learn how to play chess well only by being told what to do. Being told what
to do can help, but lots of playing (which is to say, lots of examples) generally help
more.
Few children, if any, have ever learned the meaning of the word “dog” from detailed
instructions that tell them how to recognize one. Even if children could learn from such
instructions, few parents could produce them. Most do not try. They just point to a few
examples and let the child’s mind do the rest. They can do that, presumably, because
the child is intelligent—because it can learn from examples.
3. If intelligence is computable, then: : :
We can think of a learner that tries to develop programs from examples, as a system
that tries to solve what has been called a black box identi3cation problem. In such a
problem, a learner is given the behavior of a device it cannot look inside of (a black
box) and asked to identify it by coming up with a program that exactly duplicates its
behavior. This problem is not particularly diIcult (in theory) if the behavior is 6nite
and the learner has access to all of it. But it becomes more diIcult if the behavior is (at
least potentially) in6nite, because the learner must come up with a program that dupli-
cates all of it in 6nite time. That means that it must do so after it has seen only a 6nite
part of that behavior. Thus, the program it comes up with must characterize all of the
black box’s behavior, including the parts the learner has not yet seen. This means that
it must “go beyond the information given” in a way that, I shall argue, computations
cannot.
Let me introduce a bit of terminology. Let me call the black box to be identi6ed
the sample-device. The sample-device will generally be drawn from a set of possible
devices that I propose to call the domain. (Intuitively, the sample-device represents
“this world” whereas the domain represents “the set of all possible worlds”.) If the
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learner succeeds in coming up with a (6nite) program that exactly reproduces the
(usually in6nite) behavior of the sample-device, we will say that it has acquired that
sample-device. It can then pass its program (or theory of the black box’s behavior)
to the doer. The doer can then use that program to predict the future behavior of the
sample-device and use those predictions as it sees 6t. When the learner=doer acquires
a sample-device it can predict its future behavior and that can be useful.
In acquiring a sample-device, the learner, in eDect, turns the in6nite behavior of the
sample-device into a 6nite program, or theory. This process of compressing in6nitely
many examples, most of which the learner has not yet seen, into general theories is a
model of what is often called induction. (We see a hundred swans, all of which are
white, and infer, by induction, that “All swans are white”.)
I am going to try to characterize what we might call, following Chomsky [5],
the abstract competence that underlies this process rather than what he called the
concrete performance. So I am going to assume, among other things, that the
inputs to the learner are error-free and that the learner=doer never makes clerical or
computing errors. In exchange, I am going to assume that the learner must be able to
produce the future (and past) behavior of the sample-device without error before it
can be said to have acquired it. (We can consider the eDects of errors and other
realistic limitations after the model has been developed, much as we consider the
eDects of air resistance on falling bodies only after we have developed a theory that
ignores it.)
We will call the set of all devices that a given learner can successfully acquire its
range. And we will say that a learner can cover a set of devices (or domain) if it has
that set as its range.
To explore what all this means, let’s look at an example. Suppose we want to
design a learner to deal with a rather restricted domain—the set of all 6nite automata
that generate in6nite sequences of 0’s and 1’s. Let us call such devices Zero-one
generating 3nite automata (or Zog-fa’s). A Zog-fa has no inputs and its outputs can
be represented by a one-way (to the right) in6nite tape that contains only 0’s and 1’s.
We will call such a tape an oracle (following Turing [23]). With each such tape we
can associate a representing function, f, such that f(n)= 0 if the nth symbol of the
tape is 0 and f(n)= 1 if it is 1. We can then think of a learner that tries to acquire
a Zog-fa as a system whose input is the oracle of such a machine and whose output
is a program that generates that oracle.
If we ignore the inner division of a learner=doer into two components, and assume
that the doer only executes the program passed to it by the learner, the outward be-
havior of the learner=doer system does not seem to be particularly interesting. When it
succeeds in acquiring an oracle, its input is that oracle and its output is a program that
can compute that oracle. It is because such systems produce 6nite programs that are
portable and because they can output the “next” symbol of the oracle before they read
it that such systems are useful. Those 6nite programs correspond to what biological
organisms carry around with them and use to predict the future behavior of things in
their environment. (If the object such a learner=doer is dealing with is a predator, the
resulting predictions can help the system predict the predator’s behavior and use those
predictions to try to avoid it, thus helping the system to survive.)
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Our oracles resemble Turing’s oracles in that they allow a Turing machine with
access to the oracle associated with the function f to answer questions of the form
“What is the value of f(n)?” for arbitrary n’s. Our oracles diDer from Turing’s oracles
in that, whereas his were limited to uncomputable functions, ours are limited, at least
in this paper, to computable ones. Such oracles are particularly well-suited to represent
the inputs to a learner trying to solve a black-box identi6cation problem because a
learner, with access only to an oracle, cannot “look” inside the machine that generated
it.
(Notes: In order to talk about such oracles, I will denote the sequence consisting
of all ones by “1∗” and, more generally, the sequence that consists of the in6nite
repetition of the 6nite sequence s by “s∗” [13]. I will denote the sequence that consists
of n repetitions of s by “sn”, the 6rst n symbols of s by “ns” and the result of
concatenating one sequence, s, to another, t, by “st”.)
Before looking at possible designs for learners that can acquire Zog-fa’s, let me
state an easily-proved lemma [13] about such Zog-fa’s that will prove useful in what
follows.
Lemma. For any sequence of the form s(t)∗, where s and t are 3nite sequences of
0’s and 1’s, there is a Zog-fa that generates it and, conversely, any in3nite oracle
generated by a Zog-fa must have this form.
As this lemma suggests, the Zog-fa’s are a particularly simple domain and I want to
begin by looking at how well learners can deal with it by using computations alone. The
de6ning features of an ordinary computation are (1) that it may use only the machinery
of the Turing machine and (2) that it may produce (at most) one output and that it
must halt when it has done so. When I want to distinguish ordinary computations from
other kinds (such as the limiting computations to be discussed later), I will explicitly
refer to them as ordinary (or recursive) computations.
One of the big problems with learners limited to ordinary (recursive) computations
is that they have very limited scopes. For example:
Theorem 1. No learner, limited to ordinary computing, can cover even so simple a
set as the set of all Zog-fa’s.
Proof. Assume there is a recursive-computing learner that can. Since it covers the
whole set, it must be able to acquire a program for the Zog-fa whose outputs are all
1’s from its oracle 1∗—the tape containing an in6nite sequence of 1’s. (Obviously,
there is a Zog-fa that generates such a tape.)
Now consider what happens when a computing learner acquires the device whose
oracle is this sequence of all 1’s. By the de6nition of computation there must come
some point in its operation at which it outputs a program for this oracle, announces
that it has found it, and stops. And this point must come after it has read some 6nite
number of symbols (say n) of the input oracle. Since, for the rest of this argument, the
size of n does not matter, let us assume n=10. That means that our learner’s output
is 6xed after it has read the sequence of ten 1’s (or 110). Which, in turn, means that
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it cannot come up with the right program for the tape (110)0∗. But clearly there is a
Zog-fa that generates this tape too (by our lemma).
Corollary 1.1. For any Zog-fa a recursive-computing learner can acquire, there are
in3nitely many Zog-fa’s it cannot.
In the above case, it cannot acquire any of the Zog-fa’s whose oracles have the form
(1n)0∗, with n¿10. Clearly each of these oracles can be generated by a Zogfa (by our
lemma again) and there are in6nitely many of them.
Since any computing learner that could cover a superset of the set of all Zog-fa’s
could also cover the set of all Zog-fa’s, it follows that:
Corollary 1.2. No recursive-computing learner can cover any superset of the set of
Zog-fa’s. Therefore, no computing learner can cover the set of all 3nite automata,
all Turing machines, all primitive recursive functions, and many other domains.
Oracles are in6nite sequences of 0’s and 1’s that can be ordered lexicographically.
Let us say that one oracle, O1, is less then another O2 (or O1¡O2) if O1 is earlier
in this ordering than O2. Let us call the set of all oracles between the two diDerent
oracles, Oi and Oj, an interval. Let us call an interval a gap in a learner’s range if
that learner can acquire at most one oracle in it. Gaps are clearly undesirable since
any interval has in6nitely many Zog-fa’s in it and, if it is a gap, a learner can acquire
at most one of them. So it is another strike against our computing learner that:
Corollary 1.3. A recursive-computing learner, whose domain is the set of all Zog-fa’s,
has at least one gap in its domain (and therefore, in3nitely many).
Proof. If it acquires an oracle, s, a computing learner must do so after it has read n
symbols of that oracle, or ns. But, since it has only one chance to come up with a
program, it must come up with the same program for all oracles that start with this
sequence. That is precisely the set of oracles in the interval between ns(0)∗ and ns(1)∗.
Since the one program (at most) that it can come up with is correct for only one oracle
in that interval, that interval is a gap.
Perhaps the most serious drawback of recursive-computing learners is that learn-
er=doers that use them can be very bad at predicting future symbols of their input
oracles. Let us call a system consisting of a learner and a doer related to each other
in the manner shown in Fig. 1 (above) a predictor if it reads an oracle, a symbol at
a time (from left to right), and uses the latest program output by its learner to predict
the next symbol of that oracle before it reads it. (If the learner has not yet produced
a program, let it predict 0.)
Let us say that a predictor is good for an oracle if it predicts in6nitely many symbols
of that oracle correctly (and only 6nitely many incorrectly) and bad if it predicts
in6nitely many symbols of that oracle incorrectly (and only 6nitely many correctly).
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Corollary 1.4. For every oracle that the learning component of a computing predictor
acquires, there are in3nitely many oracles of Zog-fa’s for which it is bad.
Proof. Consider a predictor, P, that computes a program for an oracle, s, after reading
the 6nite sequence ns (the 6rst n symbols of s) for some n. Let sn be all the symbols
of s after the 6rst n symbols and, for any sequence u, let (u)′ be the result of replacing
every 1 in u with a 0 and every 0 with a 1. It is not hard to see that (a) P will predict
the symbols of any oracle of the form (ns)(1m)(sn+m)′ (where m¿0 and sn+m is the
sequence of the input oracle after the 6rst n+ m symbols) incorrectly in6nitely often
and correctly only 6nitely often and (b) that any such oracle is in its domain because
it can be generated by a Zog-fa.
This “badness” is not limited to learners dealing with the set of Zog-fa’s. It applies to
any computing learner that deals with a domain that is dense in the sense that, between
any two distinct oracles in that domain, there is another that is also in the domain.
(More generally, a domain is dense if no 6nite initial sequence uniquely determines an
oracle in that domain. That condition is met by practically all interesting domains.) It
is not hard to see that:
Corollary 1.5. No recursive-computing learner can cover a dense domain.
Because recursive-computing predictors have to stick to a program long after the
evidence has shown it to be incorrect (since they are not allowed to “take back” a
result) they can seem somewhat “pigheaded”. The computable learner that produced a
program that generates 1∗ as its theory after seeing 1n, forces the associated doer to
predict 1, even if the input was 1n0∗. So, if n is 10, it is still required to predict that
the next symbol will be a 1 after it has seen 1100999990, which should make the odds
of a 1 appearing next “one in a million”. It is diIcult to call that “intelligent”.
The reason computing learners do so badly with such domains is that computations
must, by the de6nition of computation, satisfy what we might call the announcement
condition. It is not enough for them to produce a result in 6nite time. They must
also announce when they have produced it. If we drop that requirement, we can get
machines that do more than compute without changing anything else. Machines that do
not have to satisfy the announcement condition can execute what Burgin [3] has called
super-recursive algorithms—algorithms that can evaluate uncomputable functions. In
particular they can execute limiting-computable algorithms [10,19].
The distinction between what we might call recursive computing (which is the tradi-
tional kind) and limiting computing (which is one kind of super-recursive computing)
can be stated quite simply. When we use computing machinery to compute recursively,
we count the 3rst output it produces as its result. In contrast, when we use that same
machinery to limiting-compute or to compute in the limit, we count its last output as
its result. Note that we do not require that it announce when it has produced that last
output nor to halt after it has done so (which would, of course, “announce” it).
Putnam [19] has referred to predicates that can be computed in the limit as trial-and-
error predicates. In that spirit, let us call Turing machines that are allowed to compute
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in the limit trial-and-error machines. We can think of such a machine as a computing
machine that prints a sequence of outputs. We say that its “result” is the last output
it prints, if there is a last. (If there is no last—or no 6rst—the output is said to be
unde3ned.) Notice that trial-and-error machines (and the limiting-computable algorithms
they execute) produce their results in 6nite time, but that it can take in6nitely long to
determine that a given output is a result because they can always “change their minds”.
4. If intelligence is limiting computable, then: : :
Trial-and-error machines use precisely the same “hardware” as the Turing machines,
but because they do not have to satisfy the announcement condition, they can use
it diDerently. The fact that they do not have to satisfy the announcement condition
makes them useless for many purposes, including most of the purposes for which
we use computers today. But it makes them more powerful than machines limited
to recursive computations and this additional power can suit them for other things.
Thus, for example, it can make them better at generating programs (or theories) from
examples.
First, to see that limiting-computable algorithms (and the trial-and-error machines
that execute them) are more powerful than regular (recursive) computations, note that
they can solve the halting problem which, Turing [22] proved, no regular computation
can.
Recall that the halting problem is the problem of 6nding a single procedure that,
given a program, Prog, and an input, Inp, will tell us whether or not Prog(Inp) (or
Prog running on the input Inp) will or will not halt. A limiting computation can solve
this problem using the following algorithm:
Limiting computable algorithm for solving the halting problem: Given a program,
Prog, and an input Inp, output NO (to indicate that Prog(Inp) will not halt). Then
run a simulation of Prog(Inp). (Turing [22] showed that such a simulation is always
possible.) If the simulation halts, output YES to indicate that Prog(Inp) really does halt.
Clearly the last output that this procedure produces solves the halting problem, if
you are willing to accept results arrived at “in the limit”. Which proves that a limiting
computation can do things no ordinary, or recursive, computation can.
Of course, if you are interested in using your solution to detect cases in which a
program is not worth running because it will not output any result at all, this “solution”
will not help you. Although you can use its YES answers for your purpose, you cannot
use the NO answers. Because they do not satisfy the announcement condition there
will not, in general, come a time at which you can say of a program “This program
will not halt because the algorithm told me so”. And, of course, for this purpose, it is
the NO answers that matter.
Failure to meet the announcement condition is the main drawback of limiting com-
putations. They may give you right answers, but you will not always know when an
output is the 6nal answer.
But limiting computations can be useful when we are dealing with problems that have
no 6nal answers—problems for which the announcement condition cannot reasonably
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be met. The problem of generating programs for dense domains (or sets of oracles) is
such a problem. It is not hard to see why. A computing learner can only see 6nitely
many symbols of an oracle before it has to come up with its 6nal decision and, if
the set of oracles is dense, the decision it makes can always be wrong because no
6nite subsequence of an oracle uniquely speci6es it. In contrast, a limiting computable
learner need not make 6nal decisions which allows it to do things that a (recursively)
computable learner cannot. Thus they can cover dense domains. For instance:
Theorem 2. A limiting-computable learner can cover the set of all Zog-fa’s.
Proof. A limiting-computable learner can do this using what has come to be known
as an enumeration method [10,1]. An enumeration method uses a sub-program that
generates a list of totally computable programs (a1; a2; a3; : : :) such that, for any machine
in the domain, there is at least one program in the list that generates it. (The fact that
each program generated must be totally computable is important.)
An enumeration method uses the list generated by its enumerating sub-program as
follows:
• It begins by outputting the 6rst program in the list, a1, as its (tentative) result.
• As it reads the symbols of the oracle it is trying to identify, one by one, it checks
the nth symbol it reads against the nth symbol generated by the program that is its
current result (ai). If the symbols match, it does nothing and reads the next (n+1st)
symbol of the oracle. If the symbols do not match, it goes on down the enumeration
from its current theory, ai, to consider ai+1; ai+2; : : : in turn. It then outputs the 6rst
program in this list whose 6rst n symbols match the 6rst n symbols of the input
oracle—the symbols that it has already seen—if there is one.
It is not hard to see that there is a program that computably enumerates a set of
programs such that (a) for any Zog-fa, there is at least one program in the enumeration
whose output is its oracle and (b) all the programs in the enumeration are total (because
the halting problem for 6nite automata is recursively solvable).
Suppose that a limiting computation is given an oracle for an arbitrary Zog-fa as
its input. It will compute a correct program in the limit for this oracle because (a) a
correct program for the input oracle will appear in the enumeration, (b) every incorrect
program earlier in the enumeration will eventually be discarded and (c) once a correct
program is reached, it will never get discarded. Which proves the theorem.
Notice that, although the process of determining whether or not the current (tentative)
result produced by such a system is correct (at any particular moment in time), and
the process of 6nding a replacement for it if it is not, are both totally computable,
the process of 6nding the right theory for an oracle, of which they are the primary
components, is not.
It is not hard to verify the following “good news” about such a simple enumeration
process:
(a) It will get the right program in 6nite time (even though, its user will, in general,
not be able to tell when this has happened).
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(b) Its 6nal program will be “perfect” in the sense that, if it is used to predict the
symbols of the oracle it will predict all of them correctly.
(c) The learner will leave no gaps in the set of all Zog-fa’s.
(d) If a learner=doer system, trying to identify a Zog-fa, uses its latest program to
predict the next symbol of the input tape before it reads it, it will predict in6nitely
many of its symbols correctly and only 6nitely many of them incorrectly.
But there are also two pieces of “bad news”:
(e) The process will not tell the user if an input oracle cannot be produced by any
Zog-fa. If it runs into such an oracle, it will only way it will signal that fact is
by failing to produce a last output—in eDect, by “changing its mind” in6nitely
often.
(f) The announcement condition cannot be met. The learner cannot announce when
it has 6nally found the right theory of its input oracle. Which means that the user
cannot, in general, be sure when the system’s current theory is the right one.
The set of all Zog-fa’s is dense so, by Corollary 1.5, the announcement condition
cannot be met. As a result we lose the certainty that a recursive-computing algorithm
can give us. We cannot be sure, at any point, that its current output is going to be its
6nal result. But, when we are dealing with a dense domain, we do not really have a
choice.
The set of all Zog-fa’s is not the only domain that the enumeration method can be
used to cover. It can cover any set of machines that can be recursively enumerated
in such a way that all the machines in the enumeration are totally computable. So we
have the following [10].
Corollary 4.1. A learner that computes in the limit can cover the set of primitive
recursive functions, the set of 3nite automata whose outputs are limited to a 3nite
alphabet, the set of regular grammars, and a variety of other domains.
Because limiting computable learners can cover some sets of sample-devices whose
oracles are dense (such as the set of all Zog-fa’s) it is natural to ask whether such
learners can cover all possible dense sets of that can be computably enumerated. The
answer is that they cannot.
To see why not, consider 6rst systems that use the enumeration method to develop
programs for oracles that they examine one symbol at a time, in order from left to
right. Let us call them simple enumeration learners. Now consider the set of all oracles
generated, not by 6nite automata, but by Turing machines that generate sequences of
0’s and 1’s without inputs. Let us call them Zero-one generating Turing machines
or Zog-tm’s. Such machines generate oracles by computing their component symbols,
one after the other, from left to right. If, at any time, a computation of the “next”
symbol fails to produce an output, the sequence (but not necessarily the computation
producing it) stops and the oracle is 6nite.
Lemma. No simple enumeration learner can cover the set of all Zog-tm’s.
Proof. Suppose there is one that can. Call it M . Consider the Zog-tm that generates
an oracle, DM (where “D” stands for “diagonal”), de6ned in terms of M as follows:
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0. The 6rst symbol of DM is a 0.
n. If, after reading the 6rst n symbols of DM , M ’s latest program for DM predicts
that the (n+ 1st) symbol of DM will be a 1, then the (n+ 1st) symbol of DM is a 0.
If it predicts a 0, its (n+ 1st) symbol is a 1.
It is not hard to see that DM can be generated by a Zog-tm (if M is a simple
enumeration learner) because its nth symbol can be computed for any n. And it is
easy to see, from the construction, that DM cannot be identi6ed by M because it will
change its output in6nitely often.
Theorem 3 (Gold [10]). No limiting-computable learner can cover the set of all
Zog-tm’s.
Proof. The only diDerence between an arbitrary limiting-computable learner and one
based on an enumeration method is that the former may not always have a “current”
program and that they need not read the symbols of the oracle in order from left to
right or, for that matter, in any 6xed order. It is not hard to alter the construction of
DM to take those problems into account.
Let us call a learner universal if it can cover the set of all Zog-tm’s and partial if
it cannot. Theorem 3 says that limiting-computable learner can be universal.
The idea of a limiting computation is not new. Such a computation was used by
GQodel [9] in his proof of the completeness of the predicate calculus. Turing [25] seems
to have suggested that something like a limiting computation might be necessary for
machine intelligence when he wrote that “There are indications that it is possible to
make the (computer) display intelligence at the risk of its making occasional serious
mistakes”. Gold [10] and Putnam [19] showed how this idea could be formalized.
The use of limiting computable procedures to do induction has been studied by many,
including Burgin [2] and Kugel [14].
5. Therefore: : :
I have suggested that machine intelligence (and perhaps the human kind) might
involve two separate abilities—the ability to acquire programs and the ability to apply
them. I have looked at how this suggestion plays out in machines that deal with
“worlds” that contain only Zog-fa’s and Zog-tm’s. And I have tried to show that,
in these “worlds”, acquiring programs at a level that we would be willing to call
“intelligent”—because they do not lead to pigheaded predictors nor produce “gaps” in
which a predictor is helpless—requires at least the ability to compute in the limit.
But, of course, we want to be able to talk about the intelligence of machines that
deal with many other kinds of “worlds” (or domains). Fortunately, because our proofs
depend only on a few properties of the domains with which machines deal, it is not
diIcult to show that they can be used to derive comparable theorems about machines
that deal with many other kinds of domains.
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For example, Theorem 1, which tells us that computable learners have some seri-
ous drawbacks, is not limited to learners that deal with (a) input-free, (b) zero–one
generating, (c) 6nite automata or Turing machines. Similar theorems can be proved
(in similar ways) about learners that deal with (a) machines with inputs as well as
outputs, (b) machines that have a wide variety of diDerent powers and (c) machines
whose inputs and outputs are made up of more complex objects than just 0’s and 1’s.
Thus we can say that most, if not all, learners will have serious defects if they are
restricted to (recursive) computing alone and have to deal with domains that are dense
in the more general sense that any 6nite behavior—or sets of input–output pairs—of
oracles of machines in the domain can be produced by at least two diDerent machines
in the domain. These defects have to arise if we expect the system doing the induction
to satisfy the announcement condition of recursive computation.
Theorem 2 tells us that these shortcomings can be overcome by allowing a system
to compute in the limit, which is one way to specify what kind of “departure from
the completely disciplined behavior involved in computation” Turing [24] might have
had in mind (albeit perhaps only vaguely) when he suggested that is what intelligence
might require.
Since fallibility is built into limiting computations (even when the data and the
operation of the machine are both error-free), I take this to be one way to specify what
Turing [26] might have had in mind (again, perhaps only vaguely) when he wrote that
“if a machine is expected to be infallible, it cannot be expected to be intelligent”.
Theorem 3 tells us that, although limiting computable learners can handle some dense
domains (containing only computing machines), they cannot handle them all with such
methods. This is an important limitation and there are two ways we might deal with
it. We might try to develop more powerful methods that can be universal, or we might
accept partiality and do the best we can with it.
If we try to develop universal algorithms we might want to look into types of super-
recursive algorithms that are more powerful than limiting-computable ones and that
can, therefore, cover the set of all Turing machines. Burgin [4] has called abstract
machines that use them “inductive Turing machines of the second order” and I have
called them “hyper trial and error” machines [14]. A more general, and more abstract,
discussion of such procedures in logical, rather than machine, terms can be found in
Kleene’s classic paper on the arithmetic hierarchy [12].
It is hard to see how we could use hypercomputers in place of super-recursive
algorithms for this purpose [7]. Although hypercomputers (such as the neural nets of
Siegelmann [21] or the quantum computers of Kieu [11]) can evaluate super-recursive
algorithms, their ability to do so assumes that all the data they will need is potentially
available at the start.
This allows them (in theory) to solve such classical problems as Turing’s halting
problem or Hilbert’s 10th problem [17]—the problem of 6nding roots of Diophantine
equations. We might want to say that learner=doers that could use such machinery in
their doer components were more intelligent than learner=doers that could not. (After
all, it need not be only the learning component of a learner=doer that determines the
level of a machine’s intelligence.) But it is not clear how their use could do much for
the learner.
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A typical hypercomputer solves a problem like the halting problem by (in essence)
looking at the answers to an in6nity of questions in 6nite time, asking “Does it stop
after step 1”?, “Does it stop after step 2?” and so forth. This can be done (in principle,
if not in fact) because the answer to each of these individual questions can be computed
from the information given. The hypercomputer can compute the answers to all such
questions and “look” at them in 6nite time. Based on what it “sees”, it can come to a
conclusion and satisfy the announcement condition.
Unless a learner=doer has some sort of device for seeing all the values of an oracle
in some way—some sort of “crystal ball”—it is hard to see how such a hypercomputer
could help.
Hyper trial-and-error algorithms and hypercomputers can be universal but they can
be hard to implement or to use for learning from examples. In contrast, super-recursive
algorithms are relatively easy to implement. They do, however, have two signi6cant
disadvantages. One is that their results are always tentative. The other is that they
are (as Theorem 3 says) not universal. There is no single universal algorithm that
can do anything any limiting-computable algorithm can do. Nothing that corresponds
to Turing’s “universal machine” or its concrete implementation, the general purpose
digital computer. So, if intelligence is in the province of limiting-computing algorithms,
an intelligent machine may have to run more than one algorithm at a time. DiDerent
algorithms to learn about diDerent domains.
For the study of “natural” intelligence this suggests that the brain may have more
than one learning module to deal with the world. So it is satisfying to see that there
seems to be at least one case where this seems to be the case. The human brain seems
to have one module for thinking about (and therefore, presumably, learning about)
inanimate objects and another for dealing with humans [20]. These two modules seem
to be physically distinct and therefore could use diDerent algorithms. If the theory I
am proposing here makes sense, we should expect to see more such modules in the
brain.
For the development of “arti6cial” intelligence it suggests that we might want to
recognize the fact that any learning algorithms we develop will only be able to deal
with restricted domains. Learners that “only” cover the set of all 6nite automata are a
particularly tempting domain to focus on at the start. They are simple. They might be
powerful enough for many purposes, and they could provide a potentially useful test
bed for studying limiting-computing learning algorithms.
If we use simple enumeration learners for this purpose, we will have to deal with
the fact that they are enormously ineIcient at deciding what program to consider
when their current program is disproved by the evidence. (Looking through a 6xed
enumeration can result in a lot of very bad “guesses”. Finding the right theory under
such circumstances can be a bit like trying to write Hamlet by setting a bunch of
monkeys to work on typewriters.)
The basic problem is that, when such a learner discards its current theory, it has to
“decide what to think of next”. There is no general “best” order in which to choose
the next theory to consider and it is not easy to make the job of 6nding that next
theory eIcient. One way to speed up the search for the next theory would be to use
knowledge of the domain.
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For example, we know that any in6nite tape generated by a Zog-fa will be eventually
periodic, which is to say that it must be of the form t(s∗) where t is a 6nite (possibly
empty) sequence and s∗ is a 6nite sequence repeated in6nitely often. A learner that
looks for such a t and s in the part of the input oracle it has seen so far can 6nd the
“next” program to consider more eIciently than one that works “mindlessly” with a
6xed enumeration.
Another way to speed the search through the enumeration is by excluding possible
programs or by reordering the enumeration. People who take intelligence tests, for ex-
ample, are sometimes asked to continue sequences like 2; 4; : : : If the set of allowable
continuations were not severely limited, such a question would make little if any sense.
But, in fact, in IQ tests continuations of such sequences are usually implicitly limited
to sequences built up from the rules people learn in school. And those rules are also
ordered. So the sequence 2,4,6,8, built on addition, is usually thought to be a better
continuation of 2; 4; : : : than 2; 4; 8; 16; : : : ; built on multiplication, because addition is
thought to be “easier” than multiplication. And sequences like 2; 4; 5286; 35432; : : : are
not considered at all because they have no simple arithmetic explanation. Such limita-
tions (and orderings) make it much easier (and faster) for a learner to “decide” what
to “think of ” next.
As people who work in arti6cial intelligence know, sometimes searches can be
speeded up by changing the representation. Today’s programming languages describe
programs in terms of what the computer has to do to carry them out. If the algorithms
were written in a language that de6ned algorithms in terms of what they accomplished,
rather than the steps in terms of which they accomplished it, it might relatively easy
to compute the next program to consider from the description of the current program
and the datum that caused its rejection. If, for example, a program to control a golf-
playing robot has a numerical parameter that determines how hard the ball is to be
hit and a practice shot falls short, it is relatively easy to decide what to change in its
program to take the new evidence—the shot that fell short—into account. But, in our
case, changing numerical parameters only will probably narrow the domain too much.
Once we develop ways to increase the eIciency of limiting-computable learners, we
might try putting them to practical use. Among the possible uses to which implemen-
tations of such learners might be put are the following:
Programs that generate programs from examples: Today, we program computers
by telling them, step by step what to do. That is not how we usually “program” people.
Limiting computable learners—if they could be made eIcient—might make it possible
for us to program computers by showing them examples of what we want them to do
and letting them develop their own programs from those examples.
Programs that adapt to their users: A program that develops programs from exam-
ples can be used to develop models of that program’s users from the way they behave
to that program. For example, a teaching program might use the behavior of its stu-
dents to try to develop a theory of what was going on in the minds of those students.
And then it might use those theories to try to adapt its behavior to their needs.
Programs that generate theories from evidence: Predictors with limiting computable
learners model Popper’s [18] account of the scienti6c method and they might, there-
fore, be used to automate certain kinds of theory generation. Popper argued that, when
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scientists try to come up with general theories from speci6c evidence, they have dis-
proof procedure but not a proof procedure. In other words, they have a way to tell
whether any particular swan they see disproves the theory that “All swans are white”.
But they have no way to prove that every swan they see will be white. So they ef-
fectively (by Popper’s account) compute in the limit—holding on to a theory as long
as it is not disproved by the evidence. By using simple enumeration methods, comput-
ers might be able to simulate the scienti6c method (if Popper was right about how it
works). Popper’s method is not the only way that theories can be generated from evi-
dence and approaches based on other philosophical accounts of the scienti6c method,
such as that of Kuhn [16], might also be worth trying to automate.
Programs that generate programs from hints and incomplete or vague instructions:
Applying a hint goes beyond the information given and might, therefore, also pro6t
from algorithms that compute in the limit. And the “explicit” instructions given to
humans (in such natural languages as English) are not totally explicit (in contrast to
computer programs) so that, to follow them, a system also has to go beyond the infor-
mation they give. As a result, they might pro6t from using super-recursive algorithms.
When we study human intelligence we often try to compare the intelligence of
systems. We seem less interested in doing this with machines but we still do it from
time to time. Thus people sometimes say that one chess-playing program is more
intelligent than another because it plays better chess. But that compares the using
components.
When we do that, we might want to say that one system, A, is more1intelligent
than another, B, if its using component is larger or faster or more powerful in some
other way than B’s. It is this sense of comparative intelligence that makes a world-
championship chess program seem intelligent to some.
Alternatively we might focus on the learning component and say that A is more2
intelligent than B if its scope properly includes that of B or if it converges to the right
programs more quickly.
One way to extend the scope of a learner is to allow it to use more than one algorithm
at a time. It might for example, run several sub-learners, each using a diDerent strategy
to acquire programs. It could then (somehow) choose the best result that any sub-system
came up with.
Gardner [8] has suggested that human intelligence may come in diDerent “Uavors”
or “intelligences”, each suited to a diDerent domain. Given a particular problem, the
mind might set several of these intelligences (or learners) to work, leaving it to some
sort of supervisory system (which could be thought of as a model of what we call
consciousness, if you like) to decide which of the results of its learners to convey to
its user. A machine version of this idea might be worth exploring.
6. Conclusion
People tend to feel that intelligence is a good thing, even if they are unable to
say exactly what it is. But it presence in a machine might not be an unmitigated
blessing. If, as I have suggested, you cannot have real intelligence without giving up
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the announcement condition, there are purposes for which we might not want machines
to be intelligent.
Today we tend to use computers to do what we want them to do in the way we want
them to do it. If we were to let them behave intelligently, we would (if the account
I have given of intelligence here is correct) have to let them develop their own way
of doing what we ask them to do and we would have to let them to come up with
results that they could, later, change.
There are many applications for which we would want to avoid such independence
and Uexibility for very much the same reason that we might want to avoid them in
human oIce clerks. But there are some applications for which intelligence—in the
sense in which I have tried to de6ne it here—might be a good thing. 2
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